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Davis v. State: Too Young To Consent?

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Davis v. State,' the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a ten-yearold child could not give valid consent to a search of his parents' home.2 In
determining the validity of a minor's consent, the supreme court considered those factors that the court of appeals deemed relevant in Atkins v.
State.' Applying the Atkins factors, the supreme court held that tenyear-old Darrin Davis ("Darrin") "lacked that degree of mental discretion
necessary for a minor to give valid consent to the search of his, and his
parents', home."' According to Justice Sears-Collins, "[m]ost ten-year-old
children are incapable of understanding and waiving their own rights,
much less those of their parents."'5
This Casenote begins with the facts and procedural history of Davis v.
State. It then discusses the background cases leading up to the thirdparty-minor consent exception to the warrant requirement. This Casenote
concludes with an analysis of the decision and a brief summary.
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 28, 1991, ten-year-old Darrin Davis was at home alone. He
routinely arrived home from school at 3:00 p.m. His mother required him
to call to let her know he was home. Darrin was not allowed to invite
friends over or play outside while he was home alone, approximately one
and one-half hours each school day, and he had instructions to call 911 in
the case of an emergency.6
On the day of the search, Darrin arrived home safely and called his
mother. While using the phone in his parents' bedroom, he found what he
thought were drugs. Darrin called 911 and told Deputy Greg Kirby in the
Douglas County Sheriff's Department that his parents had drugs in the
1. 262 Ga. 578, 422 S.E.2d 546 (1992).
2. Id. at 581, 422 S.E.2d at 549.
3. 173 Ga. App. 9, 11, 325 S.E.2d 388, 390 (1984), aff'd, 254 Ga. 641,642, 331 S.E.2d 597,
598 (1985).
4. 262 Ga. at 582, 422 S.E.2d at 550.
5. Id. at 581, 422 S.E.2d at 550.
6. Id. at 579, 422 S.E.2d at 548.
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house and he "would like to get them some help."7 Deputy Kirby dis-r
patched Deputy Cheryl Smith to the Davis home. Deputy Kirby called
Darrin back before Deputy Smith arrived and told him to wait outside so
Deputy Smith would recognize the house. Darrin followed the instruction
and walked to the driveway when Deputy Smith arrived. Deputy Smith
followed Darrin into the house and into appellant's bedroom, where Darrin pointed out a mirror with white powder and a razor blade on it. Then
he opened a nightstand drawer and retrieved a bag of marijuana and
some rolling paper. Deputy Smith noticed a "marijuana joint" in an ashtray. The deputy seized the drugs, took them to her car, and waited inside with Darrin and another officer for his parents to return home.,
When Darrin's mother arrived, she consented to a search of her purse,
which contained additional drugs. The officers arrested her and she refused to consent to a search of the house. When appellant, Freddie Ray
Davis, returned home, the officers arrested him. He also refused to consent to a search of the premises.'
Appellant Davis was on ten years probation for drug possession under
the First Offender Act at the time of his arrest. 10 The sheriff's deputies
arrested and charged appellant Davis with violating the Georgia Controlled Substance Act.11 The trial court denied Davis' motion to suppress
the evidence seized in the search.1 2 The trial court found that "Darrin
appeared bright, articulate and educated" and that his daily routine
demonstrated that he had enough authority over the house to consent to
13
a search.
Davis filed an application for discretionary appeal.14 The court of appeals granted the appeal and found that the denial of the motion to suppress was proper, holding that Darrin had authority to give valid consent
to the warrantless search."'
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted a writ of certiorari to determine
whether the consent to search given by ten-year-old Darrin was valid. 0
The State made three other contentions. First, the State argued that no
consent was necessary because what occurred was not a search. Second,
the State contended that exigent circumstances made the warrantless
search necessary. Third, the State argued that even if the search was un7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12:
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 578, 422 S.E.2d at 548. O.C.G.A. §§ 42-8-60 to -65 (1992).
262 Ga. at 578, 422 S.E.2d at 547. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 (1992).
202 Ga. App. 629, 631, 414 S.E.2d 902, 903 (1992).
Id.
262 Ga. at 578, 422 S.E.2d at 548.

Id.
Id. at 579, 422 S.E.2d at 548.
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lawful, the trial court justifiably denied the motion to suppress based
upon the "independent source" or the "inevitable discovery" exceptions
to the exclusionary rule."
III.

BACKGROUND

The United States Supreme Court established in Katz v. United
States'8 "that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions."' One such exception is when police obtain
consent from one who possesses common authority over the premises to
search in the absence of the non-consenting target of the search.'0
Common authority that gives a third party authority to consent to a
search
rests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize
that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in
his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit the common area to be searched."
In Atkins v. State," the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmatively decided the question whether a minor could give consent to a warrantless
search."3 In Atkins the seventeen-year-old brother of appellant gave oral
and written consent to a warrantless search of his mother's premises
where he and appellant lived."' The trial court denied appellant's motion
to suppress the evidence seized during the search.'2 The supreme court
refused to accept appellant's contention that a minor, as a matter of law,
could not give valid consent to a warrantless search.' Instead, the court
held that validity of consent should be determined on a case-by-case basis, and approved the consideration of factors identified by the court of
appeals to be used in making such determinations."
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 582-83, 422 S.E.2d at 550-51.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 357.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).
Id. at 171-72 n.7.
254 Ga. 641, 331 S.E.2d 597 (1985).

23.

Id. at 641, 331 S.E.2d at 597.

24. Id., 331 S.E.2d at 598.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 641-42, 331 S.E.2d at 598.
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The factors to be examined in measuring the extent of a minor's authority over the premises include:
[W]hether the minor lived on the premises; whether the minor had a
right of access to the premises and the right to invite others thereto;
whether the minor was of an age at which he or she could be expected to
exercise at least minimal discretion; and whether officers acted reasonably in believing that the minor had sufficient control over *thepremises to
give a valid consent to search.2

Basically, the court established a totality of the circumstances test to determine if the minor, can give valid consent.
IV. THE OPINION

A.

The Consent Issue

The Supreme Court of Georgia first considered whether the consent
given by ten-year-old Darrin to search his stepfather's house was valid.
The court examined the factors laid out in Atkins to determine the validity of a minor's consent." The court also emphasized the importance of
examining "a child's mental maturity and his ability to understand the
circumstances in which he is placed, and the consequences of his actions."3 0 These last factors proved to be key in the court's determination
that Darrin did not have the authority to consent to a search of his parents' home.
The court found it most compelling that Darrin was only ten years
old.3" Although the court recognized that Darrin was a bright child, it
found that he did not have "the minimal discretion required to validly
'
consent to a search, much less waive important constitutional rights."' 3
The younger the child, the less likely he will have the minimal discretion.33 The court emphasized that Darrin did not completely understand
the consequences -of his consent.3 ' Darrin apparently believed he would
achieve family harmony by calling the police, not5 disharmony and disruption. This showed his immaturity and naivety.3
28. Atkins, 173 Ga. App. 9, 11, 325 S.E.2d 388, 390 (1984). The court compiled this list
of factors after examining cases in other jurisdictions. Id.See, e.g., Harmon v. State, 641

S.W.2d 21 (Ark. 1982); Doyle v. State, 633 P.2d 306 (Alaska 1981); State v. Folkens, 281
N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1979); Murphy v. State, 355 So. 2d 1153 (Ala. App. 1978).

29. Davis v. State 262 Ga. 578, 580, 422 S.E.2d 546, 549 (1992).
30. Id. at 581, 422 S.E.2d at 549.
31. Id., 422 S.E.2d at 550.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 582, 422 S.E.2d at 550.
35. Id. at 581, 422 S.E.2d at 550.

DAVIS

1993]

1371

While the other factors in the Atkins test were substantially met, the
court gave greater weight to the child's age36 and maturity and ruled that
he could not validly consent to the search.
The court further emphasized the reasonableness one has in expecting
privacy in one's bedroom.3 7 "From there, one may exclude the whole
world, including one's children, and especially the government."3
B.

Was This a Search?

Alternatively, the State contended that no consent was necessary because there was not a "search" at Darrin's home."' The State reasoned
that Darrin had authority to call for assistance if he needed help, and to
invite the officer into the house. According to the State, once the officer
was in the house, Darrin leading her into his parents' bedroom and pointing out what he had discovered on his own was not a search.4
The court disagreed with this argument by pointing out that Darrin
had power to invite the police into the house only to the extent required
by the emergency.4 1 When the officer saw Darrin in the driveway and realized that he was not in danger, "it became incumbent upon the officer
not to exceed the scope of the child's limited right of invitation."42 The
officer exceeding the scope of Darrin's right of invitation was a search
that required valid consent or a warrant."'
C. Exigent Circumstances Issue
The State also argued that the authorities did not need consent because exigent circumstances necessitated the warrantless search." First,
the State contended that drugs in the house with the child created exigent circumstances." But, the "presence of contraband without more
does not give rise to exigent circumstances.'

6

Additionally, the court

pointed to the deputy's testimony that there was no danger.' The deputy
did not believe that the entry was justified by "the need to protect or
36.

Id. at 582, 422 S.E.2d at 549-50.

37.

Id. at 581 n.3, 422 S.E.2d at 549 n.3.

38.

Id.

39.
40.

Id. at 582, 422 S.E.2d at 550.
Id.

41.

Id.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Torres, 705 F.2d 1287, 1297 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Id.
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preserve life or avoid serious injury."" The mere presence of drugs in the
house with the child did not excuse the warrantless search.4 '
The State also contended that the potential destruction of evidence
constituted exigent circumstances." The court found that, because the
child was home alone, there was no threat of the drugs being destroyed if
the officers took time to get a warrant. Therefore, there were no exigent
circumstances excusing the warrantless search. 1 But, the court suggested
that had the parents been home during the search, the prospective loss of
evidence may have given the officer exigent circumstances for a warrantless search."
D.

"Inevitable Discovery" and "Independent Source" Exception Issue

Finally, the State argued even if this was an unlawful search, the trial
court properly denied motion to suppress under the "inevitable discovery" and "independent source" exceptions to the exclusionary rule." For
these exceptions to apply, the government authorities must obtain the
evidence by means other than an illegal search.54 The court found that
because the State did not show a warrant would have been sought as routine procedure by the police after a phone call of this nature from a child,
the evidence would not have been ultimately discovered lawfully." Additionally, the State did not show that Darrin provided enough facts "'to
enable [a] magistrate to make an independent determination as to
whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant.' ""6

V.

ANALYSIS

Davis effectively put a limit on the age at which a minor may consent
to a search of his parents' home. While the court applied a fact-specific
analysis, it found it inconceivable that a ten-year-old would have the minimal discretion required to consent to a search.' 7 "Most ten-year-old children are incapable of understanding and waiving their own rights, much
less those of their parents."' 8
48. Id. at 583, 422 S.E.2d at 550 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)).
49. Id.
50. Id., 422 S.E.2d at 550-51.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id., 422 S.E.2d at 551.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 584, 422 S.E.2d at 551.
Id. (quoting McMahon v. State, 125 Ga. App. 491, 492, 188 S.E.2d 183, 184 (1972)).
Id. at 581, 422 S.E.2d at 550.

58. Id.
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Age ten is when the court has drawn the line, but consent' given by
minors older than ten will still be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. The
court in Davis tells police that they should take precautions and consult a
judge or magistrate when they have doubts about a child's age.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Darrin Davis should be commended for his attempt to help his parents.
No child should have to grow up in an environment where his parents are
using drugs. But, the Fourth Amendment gives even appellant Davis a
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." Allowing a
child who is immature and naive to give consent to search his parents'
home is unreasonable.
It should not be said that parents have assumed the risk of their young
child consenting to a search of the family home. This goes beyond the
nature of the relationship between a parent and a child, especially when
the child is not mature enough to understand the consequences of his
consent. Once the child reaches a maturity level where he understands
these consequences, the parents' expectation of privacy diminishes. Then,
the rest of the factors of Atkins needs0 to be examined to determine
whether the minor's consent was valid.
This decision should not dissuade children from calling authorities
when they find drugs. But, it ought to warn police officers to be more
cautious. Children should not be used as pawns by the police to circumvent basic constitutional rights.
JUDSON ROBERT JAHN

59,

U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.

60. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

